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Summary
The transformation from the OAU to the AU in the early 
2000s, and the development of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture, raised the regional organization’s 
role in the maintenance of security and the promotion of 
human rights on the continent. However, the AU has not 
managed to link the African human rights and security 
architectures meaningfully, often favouring political en-
gagement and dialogue toward negotiated settlements, 
with human rights considerations playing a secondary 
role. This policy brief specifies numerous recommenda-
tions to partners and donors as well as the various AU 
organs and institutions. Fine-tuned support for better 
coordination and communication between the AU Com-
mission, the ACHPR and the African Court could bolster 
the AU’s ability to respond meaningfully and effectively to 
conflict situations. Ultimately, success hinges on the politi-
cal will of the AU member-states.
Introduction
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was found-
ed as a bulwark against external interference, empha-
sizing anti-colonial struggles and regional solidarity,1 
while human rights concerns were largely left to the 
discretion of member-states. Recently the African Un-
ion (AU) has taken notable steps towards institution-
alising and promoting human rights norms among 
member-states and at organizational levels.2 The 
transformation from the OAU to the AU in the early 
2000s, and the development of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA), heightened the regional 
organization’s role in maintaining security and pro-
moting human rights. However, the AU’s responses 
to conflict situations involving human rights viola-
tions have raised tensions between its human rights 
and security architectures,3 and the organization has 
often been challenged, even subverted, by other actors 
in the international community.
Linking Regional Security and Human Rights
In theory… 
The main pillar of the AU’s human rights architec-
ture is the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, establishing the African Commission on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) as a supervisory 
body to promote and protect the rights in the Charter. 
Although it recognized the indivisibility of civil, politi-
1 Alden. (2010) “’A Pariah in Our Midst’: Regional organizations 
and the problematic of Western-designated pariah regimes - the 
case of SADC/Zimbabwe and ASEAN/Myanmar”. Crisis States 
Research Centre Working Paper. London: Destin Development 
Studies Institute. 
2 African Union. (2000) Constitutive Act. (Articles 4m and 4n)
3 ‘Architecture’ here refers to a combination of treaties, institu-
tions and mechanisms.
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cal, economic, social and cultural rights, the Charter 
was criticized for including ‘claw-back’ clauses that 
made certain rights subject to domestic law. Especial-
ly criticized were the non-binding nature of ACHPR 
decisions, and the failure of member-states to imple-
ment its recommendations. In 2004, after numerous 
delays, the ACHPR was complemented by the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights.4 In 2011, restric-
tions on the admission of cases were softened through 
an innovative move, allowing the ACHPR, member-
states, African inter-governmental organizations, 
NGOs and even individuals to submit cases directly to 
the court when violations of the African Charter were 
suspected.
Recognizing the shortcomings of OAU structures 
in light of changing threats to peace and security on 
the continent, the AU Constitutive Act of July 2000 
provided for a more strongly interventionist security 
architecture at the level of the AU. To operationalize 
this vision, the African Peace and Security Architec-
ture (APSA) was established. The Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) would be the primary political organ, 
with decision-making responsibility for how the AU 
should respond to conflict situations. The PSC was 
vested with authority to act in response to potential 
or actual conflict situations, impose sanctions on 
member-states, suspend member-states in case of un-
constitutional changes of government and authorize 
the deployment of peace-support operations. The PSC 
was to seek close cooperation with the ACHPR, which 
in turn would bring relevant information to the atten-
tion of the PSC.
… and in practice
With the AU playing a more active and prominent role 
in the management of conflict situations in the region, 
tensions have emerged between its human rights and 
security architectures. And in 2011, the AU found itself 
responding to crises, first in Côte d’Ivoire and then in 
Libya.
Côte d’Ivoire 
In March 2011, tensions and violence following the No-
vember 2010 presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire es-
calated into armed conflict, with human rights abuses 
committed by all parties to the conflict. While human 
rights concerns were noted in the PSC’s discourse 
and its subsequent decisions, regional stability was 
the main issue. The regional economic community 
in West Africa, ECOWAS, and the UN initially sup-
ported the AU’s political approach, but soon focused 
on human rights concerns, adopting a more interven-
tionist approach to bring an end to the conflict. The 
continent-level human rights mechanisms (notably 
the ACHPR) were largely marginalized by other AU 
decision-making bodies.
Libya
In the wake of the Arab Spring, protests erupted in 
eastern Libya in early 2011. Government reprisals 
sparked a serious armed rebellion a month later, and 
the country descended into civil conflict. The AU mo-
bilized its security architecture, again promoting po-
litical engagement while human rights violations were 
rapidly escalating. This time, however, the regional 
human rights mechanisms came to play a more ac-
tive role. In March 2011, the ACHPR condemned the 
actions of the Libyan government and instituted pro-
ceedings in the African Court for ‘serious and massive 
violations of human rights’.  That same month, and 
for the first time, the Court ordered provisional meas-
ures against a member-state, requiring Libya to ‘im-
mediately refrain from any action that would result in 
loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons’ 
in breach of the African Charter or other international 
human rights instruments to which Libya is party. 
The AU, however, failed to enforce these provisions, 
with several member-states actively working to mar-
ginalize the role of the ACHPR and the African Court, 
and their recommendations and decisions had scant 
impact on the AU’s approach to the conflict.
Observations and Recommendations
First, no significant efforts have been made to link the 
African human rights mechanisms ( the ACHPR and 
the African Court) with the APSA, or with decision-
making in the AU through the PSC or the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government. While the AU hu-
man rights architecture is nominally detached from 
member-states, the PSC is an inherently political or-
gan led by member-states. This gives the ACHPR and 
the Court independence and legitimacy – but leaves 
these human rights actors with little direct power to 
enforce decisions, or for human rights considerations 
to influence decision-making in the PSC. While hu-
man rights violations have been declared primary se-
curity concerns for the region, actual roles and respon-
sibilities between decision-making bodies and the 
procedures for responding to human rights violations 
remain unclear, and regional human rights and secu-
rity decision-making processes have tended to bypass 
one another.5 
• AU member-states should give greater considera-
tion to the inter-linkages between the regional hu-
man rights and security architectures, in general 
and when making decisions in response to specific 
conflict situations. The new African Governance 
Architecture and the African Human Rights Strat-
egy present an opportunity here.
4 The African Court is to be merged with the proposed African 
Court of Justice to form a permanent court, the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights.
5 Murray. (2004) Human rights in Africa: from the OAU to the Af-
rican Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 48.
3• Donors and partners could provide specific support 
to such efforts – and to outlining more clearly roles 
and responsibilities – in decision-making proc-
esses where human rights and security architec-
tures of the AU come together, especially where the 
ACHPR, the African Court, the decision-making 
organs of the AU and the AU Commission (AUC) 
all hold specific responsibilities.
Second, AU member-states seem insufficiently aware 
of the work and role of the ACHPR and the African 
Court, not least of the binding nature of the Court’s 
decisions. At best, many member-states view the ACH-
PR and the Court as largely advisory bodies – at worst, 
both institutions are sidelined in decision-making.
• The ACHPR and the Court should work to raise 
awareness among member-states of their role and 
mandate, and of their decision-making mecha-
nisms and procedures.
• Donors and partners could support initiatives by 
the ACHPR and the Court to raise awareness, in-
terest and ownership of both institutions by AU 
member-states, while underscoring the independ-
ence and impartiality of these mechanisms. Such 
initiatives should not promote an external agenda, 
but instead conform to the decisions taken by AU 
member-states.
Third, the linkages between the AUC, which functions 
as the AU secretariat, and the ACHPR and the African 
Court are extremely weak. While interaction does take 
place at the individual level,6 there is no institutional-
ized interaction,7 perhaps due partly to geographical 
separation (the AUC in Addis Ababa, the ACHPR in 
Banjul and the African Court in Arusha). Despite legal 
provisions for heightened cooperation,8 political pro-
cedures for addressing human rights abuses within 
member-states are de-linked and stove-piped.
• The ACHPR, the African Court and the AUC 
should establish clear mechanisms for coordina-
tion and regular institutional engagement through 
liaison offices, coordination meetings, or other rel-
evant mechanisms.
• Donors and partners could encourage greater in-
teraction between human rights mechanisms and 
the AUC and the AU’s political organs, e.g. through 
support for the establishment of an ACHPR and 
African Court liaison office in Addis Ababa. 
Fourth, despite the prominent role accorded the 
ACHPR, it has been largely side-lined by AU member-
states, for political reasons. While the ACHPR is a qua-
si-judicial body and can hear individual complaints, its 
recommendations, unlike the decisions of the Court, 
are not binding, and it is up to individual member-
states to implement recommendations. Since 2008, 
no report of the ACHPR had been approved by the AU 
Assembly.9 Chronically under-resourced, the ACHPR 
has had neither the means nor the political access to 
elevate this as a concern to AU member-states.10 
• The ACHPR should identify member-states which 
are supportive of their role, and willing to bring 
matters of relevance to their work onto the agenda 
of AU meetings and summits.
• Partners and donors could provide technical sup-
port to AU member-states willing to work towards 
greater recognition of the work and reports of the 
ACHPR in AU decision-making processes. 
Fifth, while the African Court has a broad remit to 
address human rights concerns and take decisions 
binding on member-states, the Court commenced op-
erations only in 2006, and has not heard sufficient 
cases to assert its role vis-à-vis AU member-states or 
AU decision-making bodies. Decisions on Libya give 
an indication of the Court’s potential role, but only 
time will tell whether it can enforce its powerful man-
date. The planned merger of the African Court with 
the proposed African Court of Justice to form the Afri-
can Court of Justice and Human Rights (AfCJHR) will 
open new opportunities, but also bring unpredictabil-
ity that may further delay the institutionalization of an 
empowered human rights judicial body.
• The Court should work to identify member-states 
willing to encourage the development of a judicial 
entity that is assertive, and to effectively bring deci-
sions of the Court into AU decision-making proc-
esses. The Court should work with member-states 
to ensure that the proposed AfCJHR does not suf-
fer from the same lack of political will. 
• Partners and donors could provide technical sup-
port to member-states willing to work towards 
greater recognition of the Court, and support the 
processes related to the establishment and develop-
ment of the AfCJHR.
6  Personal interview 1. (2011). Addis Ababa. 
7  Murray. (2004) Human rights in Africa : from the OAU to the Afri-
can Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 70.
8 African Union. (2000) Constitutive Act.  art. 3 (h) and 4 (m) Af-
rican Union. (2002) Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban.  Article 
19: African Union. (2004) Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights. African Union. (2007a) Afri-
can Charter on Democracy, Governance and Elections, Addis Ababa. 
Art 45 (c)  African Union. (2009) African Union Convention for the 
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 
Kampala.  Art 3 (e) and (f).
 9  Personal interview 5. (2011). Addis Ababa. 
10 Sceats. (2009) “Africa’s New Human Rights Court: Whistling in 
the Wind?”. Chatham House briefing paper. London: Chatham 
House. p. 4. and Human Rights Monitor. (2012) “Human Rights 
Monitor Quarterly”. 1. p. 33.
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Finally, while significant investments have been made 
in developing the regional security architecture, this is 
not the case with the regional human rights architec-
ture – a discrepancy particularly evident at the level of 
the AUC. The Peace and Security Department (PSD) is 
well-staffed and funded – but not the Political Affairs 
Department, which deals with human rights and hu-
manitarian issues.11 This imbalance in funding has re-
sulted in sub-optimal coordination between the AUC 
departments tasked with human rights and peace and 
security matters. It remains to be seen whether this 
can be rectified by the recently launched African Gov-
ernance Architecture and the African Human Rights 
strategy.
• AU member-states should work with the AUC to 
ensure that priority areas are suitably staffed and 
resourced, and demand greater coordination and 
harmonization of human rights and security is-
sues.
• Partners and donors could explore modalities to 
provide targeted support beyond the AU PSD as 
part of a longer-term strategy to bolster the AU’s 
ability to develop holistic responses to conflict sit-
uations. Partners could link their support for the 
development of the APSA to the development of 
the continent-level human rights architecture, and 
encourage the development of linkages within the 
AUC in this regard.
The human rights and security architectures of the 
AU, while on paper mutually constitutive and rein-
forcing, are in reality divorced from one another. This 
critically affects the AU’s legitimacy and credibility as 
well as its ability to assert itself as the primary actor in 
the region. Unless these tensions are resolved, the AU 
is likely to face external interference when respond-
ing to future conflicts. Then the AU may find its le-
gitimacy and credibility questioned, not only by the 
international community, but also by its own member-
states. The above recommendations can go some way 
towards addressing the existing shortcomings of the 
AU’s conflict management approach, it is ultimately 
the political will of the AU member-states to empower 
the regional human rights mechanisms and relevant 
components of the AUC that will elevate human rights 
concerns in regional conflict management approach-
es, and reconcile the discrepancies between the conti-
nental human rights and security architectures.
11  Donors are reluctant to fund the PAD unless it shows improve-
ments in management and implementation. Personal interview 
6. (2011). Addis Ababa. 
